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Abstract
This paper studies coalition formation among individuals who differ in productivity.
The output of a coalition is determined by the sum of the productivities and the size
of the coalition. We consider egalitarian societies in which coalitions split their surplus
equally and individualistic societies in which the surplus of a coalition is split according
to productivity. Preferences of coalition members depend on their material payoffs, but
are also influenced by relative payoff concerns, which relate their material payoffs to
the average material payoff in the coalition. Our analysis uses two stability notions,
the Core and the Myopic Stable Set.
The stable partitions in both egalitarian and individualistic societies are segregated,
i.e., individuals with adjacent productivities form coalitions. If some individuals are
not part of a productive coalition, then these are the least productive ones for egalitar-
ian societies and the most productive ones for individualistic societies. If all individuals
have different productivity levels and there are sufficient complementarities in produc-
tion, egalitarian societies induce more efficiency than individualistic societies.
KEYWORDS: Group Formation, Segregation, Relative Payoff, Egalitarianism, Meri-
tocracy, Social Environment.
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1 Introduction
Historically, the exercise of power has been pervasive to every society albeit being present
in different forms. Those forms of coercion can be naturally traced back to the idea of
the “state of nature”, a hypothetical primitive scenario in which neither property rights
nor socio-political institutions of enforcement exist. According to the political philosopher
Thomas Hobbes (1651), this condition of “mere nature” induces a bellum omnium contra
omnes in which the most advantaged individuals are the physically strongest ones.
In the state of nature, however, individuals share the wish of ending the conflicts in order
to claim properties and to benefit from their goods. This common desire leads into a “social
contract” which bans the coercive force in favor of the enforcement power of institutions
which ensure social norms and property rights.1 In broad economic terms, different societies
can be seen as the outcome of different social contracts.
In this paper, we study a frequently observed phenomenon in all non-primitive societies,
the formation of coalitions - groups of individuals with a common goal. Different examples
include firms, groups that provide a local public good, political parties, and cartels. We
analyze situations in which the social contract is such that membership in a coalition is
voluntary, i.e., individuals cannot exert their power or abilities in order to subjugate others.2
We model two possible and alternative outcomes of a social contract, an egalitarian and
an individualistic society. The individualistic society does not allow coercion, but there is no
enforcement of resource redistribution within it, i.e., each member of a coalition receives a
material payoff which is proportional to his or her own productivity. The egalitarian society
also does not allow for coercive force, but guarantees an equal distribution of resources within
a coalition through institutions or norms, i.e., each member of a coalition receives the same
material payoff.
In addition to the material payoff, preferences are influenced by positional concerns. The
phenomenon of positional concern, especially about income and consumption, was first elabo-
rated by Duesenberry (1949) who proposed the “demonstration effect” to explain how a fam-
ily’s consumption is influenced by the purchases of its neighbors. Based on this observation,
he developed the “relative income hypothesis” which states that the level of consumption
satisfaction of an individual depends on the individual’s relative rank in the society.
Following the same line of reasoning, Frank (1985) argues that positional concerns can
explain many real world phenomena such as flatter intrafirm wage profiles in which low pro-
ductivity workers and high productivity workers are paid more and less with respect to their
1On this point of view, see Muthoo (2004) and Hafer (2006) who study models explaining the rise of
property rights from the state of nature.
2Models with different forms of coercion are due to Jordan (2006), Piccione and Rubinstein (2007),
Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008), Piccione and Razin (2009), and Jordan and Obadia (2015).
1
marginal contribution to compensate for the difference in relative ranking. More recently,
Card, Mas, Moretti, and Saez (2012) have shown that high relative wages affect job satisfac-
tion and Bracha, Gneezy, and Loewenstein (2015) have shown a positive correlation between
the supply of labor and relative wages. Moreover, happiness is found to be significantly
and negatively affected by a lower relative income (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Luttmer, 2005;
Clark, Frijters, and Shields, 2008). To sum up, it is widely accepted that people do not only
care about their absolute wealth, but also about their relative ranking in society.
Motivated by these findings, we study a coalition formation model with positional con-
cerns. We model the importance of the relative position in a coalition by the intragroup
relative payoff. This measures the difference between the material payoff of an individual
and the average material payoff of the coalition to which the individual belongs.
We employ two different solution concepts to analyze societies. First, the classic concept
of the Core which consists of all partitions for which there is no coalition such that all
members benefit from deviating. As a second solution concept, we consider the Myopic
Stable Set as introduced in Demuynck, Herings, Saulle, and Seel (2019). In the setting of
this paper, the Myopic Stable Set is the minimal set of partitions such that (i) from any
partition in the set, no sequence of myopic coalitional improvements leaves the set and (ii)
for any given initial partition, there is a sequence of myopic coalitional improvements which
leads to an element in the set.
For both egalitarian and individualistic societies, we provide a full characterization of
the Core and the Myopic Stable Set and show that both solution concepts coincide. In both
societies, every productive coalition consists of members with adjacent productivities. In
egalitarian societies, only the least productive individuals may not be part of a productive
coalition, while in individualistic societies only the most productive individuals may not be
part of a productive coalition. This finding might be counterintuitive at first sight, as one
might expect that egalitarian societies benefit less productive and individualistic societies
are to the advantage of more productive individuals.
The reasoning behind the predictions for egalitarian societies is as follows. First, note
that in an egalitarian society there is no envy among individuals, i.e. the relative payoff of
each individual in each coalition is the same. Thus, individuals prefer to stay with highly
productive individuals in order to increase their material payoffs. This leads to top-down
segregation. In contrast, the results for individualistic societies rely on the fact that in
individualistic societies, the individuals with the lowest productivity are very attractive as
coalition members, since they do not affect the material payoffs but yield a higher relative
payoff to other members of the coalition. Since these incentives are mutual, groups of
individuals with low productivity will form. Intuitively, a similar process repeats until only
individuals with high productivity might remain in unproductive coalitions. This process
leads to bottom-up segregation.
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The analysis of the egalitarian case would remain the same in the absence of relative payoff
concerns. Since the specification of payoffs in the egalitarian model eliminates any positional
concerns, there would still be top-down segregation. This finding is shared with Farrell
and Scotchmer (1988) who analyze properties of the Core of an egalitarian society without
relative payoff concerns under slightly stronger assumptions. The existence of relative payoff
concerns is crucial for our findings in the individualistic case. Otherwise, individuals would
not care about the productivity levels of their coalition partners and would only be concerned
by joining a coalition that has sufficiently many members. As a result, there would be no
segregation in individualistic societies when relative payoff concerns are absent.
We provide a comparative welfare analysis between the two types of societies. When
all individuals differ in productivity and there are sufficient complementarities in produc-
tion, stable partitions in egalitarian societies are always at least as materially efficient as
stable partitions in individualistic societies. In an egalitarian society, the most productive
individuals are always part of a productive coalition, while this might not be the case for
individualistic societies.
1.1 Related Literature
The paper is part of the vast literature on the theory of coalition formation (e.g. Ray, 2007;
Ray and Vohra, 2014). Our model belongs to the class of hedonic games (e.g., Banerjee,
Konishi, and So¨nmez, 2001; Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002), which are non-transferable
utility games in which agents have preferences over the coalitions to which they belong. In
particular, there are no externalities caused by other coalitions; for an overview on that
topic, see Ko´czy (2018).
Our solution concepts, the Core and the Myopic Stable Set are myopic in the sense
that agents do not anticipate that deviations by coalitions may trigger further deviations
by other coalitions. As is shown in Demuynck, Herings, Saulle, and Seel (2019), a Myopic
Stable Set exists under weak assumptions on the primitives. Another well-known myopic
solution concept is the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set as introduced in von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944). One of the drawbacks of this latter concept is that it may not
exist. If a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set exists, it is guaranteed to have a non-empty
intersection with the Myopic Stable Set by Theorem 3.15 of Demuynck, Herings, Saulle, and
Seel (2019).
There is also an extensive literature that focuses on farsighted solution concepts, where
agents consider the entire chain of coalitional deviations that could occur, and only care about
the utility provided at the very end of the deviation process. For some notable examples
of the farsighted approach, the reader is referred to Chwe (1994), Herings, Mauleon, and
Vannetelbosch (2009), Page and Wooders (2009), and Ray and Vohra (2015).
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Our work is closely related to an increasing branch of literature devoted to the role of
social norms in group formation (e.g. Watts, 2007; Piccione and Razin, 2009; Barbera`,
Bevia´, and Ponsat´ı, 2015; Morelli and Park, 2016; Bevia´, Co´rchon, and Romero-Medina,
2017). Watts (2007) studies a model with a fixed number of groups and agents who either
all want to be the highest status agent in their group or who all want to join the highest
status group that they can join. Piccione and Razin (2009) consider a more abstract partition
function form game in which the relative strength of coalitions is represented by an exogenous
“power relation”. Agents care only about their social ranking, which is determined by their
own individual power and by the power of the coalition to which they belong.
As in Barbera`, Bevia´, and Ponsat´ı (2015) and Morelli and Park (2016), we consider a
model of coalition formation in which agents are vertically differentiated in productivity and
societies can use different sharing rules to allocate the surplus in a society to its members.
Morelli and Park (2016) study how the degree of heterogeneity in the remuneration of the
individuals affects the number of rival coalitions and they find a positive relation. Barbera`,
Bevia´, and Ponsat´ı (2015) consider a model where members of society vote between egalitari-
anism and meritocracy as the guiding principle to distribute the joint benefits of cooperation.
An important difference between both works and ours is that we incorporate positional con-
cerns into our analysis. Given our emphasis on relative payoff concerns, our contribution
can be also broadly related to the literature on social and interdependent preferences (e.g.
Dufwenberg, Heidhues, Kirchsteiger, Riedel, and Sobel, 2011; Maccheroni, Marinacci, and
Rustichini, 2012).
Notable contributions to the study of segregation and stability in group formation are
Milchtaich and Winter (2002), Pe¸ski and Szentes (2013), Goyal, Herna´ndez, Mart´ınez-
Ca´novas, Moisan, Mun˜oz-Herrera, and Sa´nchez (2018), and Kets and Sandroni (2019).
Milchtaich and Winter (2002) present a model of group formation based on the assump-
tion that individuals prefer to associate with people similar to them. For the case where
individuals’ characteristics are one-dimensional, they give sufficient conditions for stable par-
titions to be segregating. Preferences for similar agents are implicit in Goyal, Herna´ndez,
Mart´ınez-Ca´novas, Moisan, Mun˜oz-Herrera, and Sa´nchez (2018), who show both theoret-
ically and experimentally how segregation can arise in coordination games when agents,
belonging to one of two types, can choose with whom to interact. Kets and Sandroni (2019)
endogenize agents’ preferences for interacting with their own group by modeling the process
by which agents take others’ perspective. In our approach, segregation arises without the
assumption that individuals have homophilous preferences. Pe¸ski and Szentes (2013) show
how segregation can even arise when types are payoff-irrelevant in an equilibrium of a dy-
namic economy where agents condition their decisions on the payoff-irrelevant characteristics
of their potential partners.
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2 Model
In this section, we introduce a model of a society where individuals differ in their productiv-
ity. Individuals have the possibility to form coalitions, think for example about the formation
of local communities or firms. The production technology of a coalition includes complemen-
tarities, i.e., it exhibits increasing returns to scale up to a certain threshold and constant
returns to scale above this threshold. The surplus created by a coalition is increasing in the
productivity of the coalition members.
Societies differ in how individuals split the total surplus of a coalition among its members.
In an egalitarian society, the surplus is divided equally, while the surplus is divided in
proportion to productivity in an individualistic society. Individuals rank coalitions based on
their own material payoffs. In case two coalitions provide the same material payoff to an
individual, then the coalition where the individual has a higher payoff relative to the other
members of the coalition is preferred.3 This models the empirically documented increased
happiness associated with a higher relative income.
We now formally describe the building blocks of a society pN, λ, τq. The finite set N 
t1, . . . , nu consists of all individuals in the society. A coalition S is a non-empty subset of
N and the collection of all possible non-empty coalitions is denoted by N  2NztHu. The
collection of all partitions of a coalition S P N is denoted by PpSq. The set PpNq of all
partitions of N is also denoted by P. We write |P | for the number of coalitions in a partition
P P P.
Let λ P RN   be the productivity vector, where λi represents the productivity level of
individual i. Without loss of generality, the individuals in N are indexed in decreasing order
of productivity, i.e., λ1 ¥ λ2 ¥    ¥ λn. Let some coalition S P N be given. An individual
i P S such that λi ¥ λj (λi ¤ λj) for all j P S is called a strong (weak) individual in S.
For S  N , we drop the reference to the coalition and simply refer to an individual as a
strong or a weak individual. We define the top individual in S as tpSq  miniPS i and the
bottom individual in S as bpSq  maxiPS i, so as the lowest and highest numbered individual
in coalition S, respectively. Notice that tpSq is a strong and bpSq is a weak individual in S.
The surplus upSq of coalition S P N is given by τp|S|q°iPS λi, where τ is a non-negative
function on t1, . . . , nu with τpnq  1. The function τ is weakly increasing, which captures
complementarities in production. We define the productivity threshold ρ P t1, . . . , nu as the
smallest number q P t1, . . . , nu such that τpqq ¡ 0 and we define the maximum productivity
threshold ρ¯ P t1, . . . , nu as the smallest number q P t1, . . . , nu such that τpqq  1. Notice that
τpqq  1 for every q ¥ ρ¯. The average surplus in coalition S is denoted by upSq  upSq{|S|.
Our production function extends both the specification used in Farrell and Scotchmer
3We relax the assumption of a lexicographic preference structure in Section 6.
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(1988) and in Barbera`, Bevia´, and Ponsat´ı (2015). Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) look at
the same functional form but require τ to be strictly increasing, which implies ρ¯  n,
and require τpqq{q to be strictly decreasing for q sufficiently large. The functional form in
Barbera`, Bevia´, and Ponsat´ı (2015) follows if we take τpqq  0 for every q   ρ and we set
ρ  ρ¯. The commonly studied stag hunt game, where a coalition exceeding a particular size
is needed to hunt stag, provides an illustration for the latter specification.
Our next step is to specify how a coalition S P N distributes its surplus over the coalition
members. We denote the material payoff of individual i P S by mipSq P R. We consider
two natural ways to divide the surplus. A division is egalitarian if each member i of a
coalition S receives the same payoff. A division is individualistic if each individual i P S is
paid proportional to the own productivity. These restrictions could be legal requirements,
but they can also be thought of as social norms within a society. If the material payoff of
individual i P S is determined according to the egalitarian division, then it is denoted by
mei pSq, whereas we use m
ind
i pSq for the individualistic division.
Definition 2.1 (Egalitarian Society). A society pN, λ, τq is egalitarian if surplus division
within coalitions is egalitarian, i.e., for all S P N and for all i P S,
mei pSq  upSq  τp|S|q
°
iPS λi
|S|
.
Definition 2.2 (Individualistic Society). A society pN, λ, τq is individualistic if surplus di-
vision within coalitions is individualistic, i.e., for all S P N and for all i P S,
mindi pSq  τp|S|qλi.
We now incorporate relative payoff concerns for our given society pN, λ, τq. The relative
payoff of individual i P N in coalition S P N equals ripSq  mipSqupSq. The relative payoff
measures the material payoff of individual i relative to the average payoff in the individual’s
coalition. The relative payoff of individual i in coalition S in an individualistic society is
denoted by rindi pSq.
4 In an egalitarian society, the relative payoff of individual i in coalition
S is equal to rei pSq  0.
We extend the definitions of material payoffs and relative payoffs from coalitions to
partitions. For every P P P and i P N , we denote by mipPq the material payoff of individual
i in partition P , i.e., mipPq  mipSipPqq, where SipPq is the coalition to which individual
i belongs in partition P . Similarly, we write ripPq  ripSipPqq for the relative payoff of
individual i in partition P .
4Our results for individualistic societies would extend to alternative definitions of relative payoff as long
as an individual’s relative payoff within a coalition increases in case a strong individual in the coalition leaves
as well as in case a more productive individual is replaced by a less productive one.
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We are now ready to define the preferences of individual i P N over the partition space.
For every P ,Q P P, we define relative payoff preferences ©i over P by setting P ©i Q if and
only if either mipPq ¡ mipQq or [mipPq  mipQq and ripPq ¥ ripQqs. Thus, individual i
prefers the partition with the higher material payoff and if two partitions deliver the same
material payoff, the one with the higher relative payoff. We denote the asymmetric part of
©i by ¡i .
The final part of this section considers our modeling of the coalition formation process.
Let us first illustrate our model informally in the context of firms. Workers can deviate by
either joining another firm or by grouping together to found a new firm. In both cases, such
a deviation results in a new coalition. If another firm has no workers involved in such a
deviation, it remains intact and operates as before. If a firm is left by some workers, the firm
continues to operate with the remaining workers. This uniquely determines the assignment
of workers to firms which results after a deviation by some workers.
Formally, the final building block of our social environment is an effectivity correspondence
E. For each pair of partitions P ,Q P P, the effectivity correspondence E associates a
collection of coalitions EpP ,Qq  N which can move from P to Q. As is common in
this literature, only a single coalition moves at the same time.5 If EpP ,Qq  H, then no
coalition can move from P to Q. If T P EpP ,Qq, then coalition T can move from partition
P to partition Q.
We distinguish three groups that are affected by a move of coalition T from P to Q: the
moving individuals T themselves, the residual individuals, and the outsiders. The moving
individuals T create a new coalition and leave their former coalition members, the residual
individuals, behind. Formally, for every P ,Q P P and T P EpP ,Qq, the residual individuals
are given by
RpP , T q  ti P NzT | SipPq X T  Hu.
The outsider coalitions U are coalitions that are not influenced by the activity of the moving
individuals. Formally, we have
UpP , T q  tS P P |S X T  Hu.
The members of the coalitions in UpP , T q are called the outsiders and are collected in the
set UpP , T q  SPUpP,T q S.
The related literature entertains different assumptions regarding the residual individu-
als. We consider the δ-model (see Hart and Kurz, 1983) which prescribes that the residual
5This assumption does not affect the Core as each member of each moving coalition would have to be
better off. In Section 5, where the Myopic Stable Set is studied, multiple coalitions are allowed to move
sequentially.
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individuals stay together.6
We also assume that the deviating coalition does not have the power to influence the
outsiders. The effectivity correspondence is therefore defined as
EpP ,Qq  tT P N |T P Q, UpP , T q  Q, @i P RpP , T q, SipPqzT P Qu, P ,Q P P.
It follows from the definition that, for every P P P, EpP ,Pq  P , that is, any coalition in
P can choose to stay at P . We write QpP , T q P P to denote the partition that results when
the current partition is P and the moving coalition is T.
This completes the description of the effectivity correspondence and thereby of our social
environment Γ  pN,P, E, t©iuiPNq induced by a society pN, λ, τq.
3 Stability and Segregation
In this section, we introduce the solution concept of the Core and our notion of segregation.
To define the Core, we first introduce the concept of strict dominance which requires that
each member of a deviating coalition is strictly better off.
Definition 3.1 (Strict Dominance). Let Γ  pN,P, E, t©iuiPNq be a social environment
induced by a society. A partition Q P P strictly dominates P P P by S P N if Q  QpP , Sq
and Q ¡i P for all i P S.
Let a coalition S P N be given. Let fS : PÑ P be the coalitional dominance correspon-
dence, where, for every P P P, fSpPq denotes the set of partitions that strictly dominate
P by S. Since the partition that results from E when the current partition is P and the
moving coalition is S is uniquely determined and equal to QpP , Sq, we have that fSpPq is
equal to the singleton tQpP , Squ if QpP , Sq ¡i P for all i P S and fSpPq is equal to the
empty set otherwise. We write fpPq  SPN fSpPq to denote the subset of P consisting of
all partitions that strictly dominate P . Such partitions are also referred to as myopic im-
provements upon P . The Core equals the set of partitions which are not strictly dominated
by another partition.
Definition 3.2 (Core). Let Γ  pN,P, E, t©iuiPNq be a social environment induced by a
society. The Core equals the set of partitions C  tP P P | fpPq  Hu.
6An alternative specification is the γ-model, which prescribes that residual individuals fall apart into
singleton coalitions. Ko´czy and Lauwers (2007) use this specification when defining the Minimal Dominant
Set. In our context of a society, the δ-model seems more natural to us as one would not expect a firm to
fall apart into singletons if some individuals leave. Nevertheless, use of the γ-model would lead to similar
results in our set-up.
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We now give a formal definition of segregation.
Definition 3.3 (Segregated Partition). Let pN, λ, τq be a society. The partition P P P is
segregated if the following two properties hold:
i. Coalitional assortativity: For every S, T such that |S| ¥ ρ and S  T , we have
λbpSq ¥ λtpT q or λbpT q ¥ λtpSq.
ii. Homophily: If S P P satisfies |S| ¡ ρ¯, then, for all i, j P S, we have λi  λj.
Coalitional assortativity requires that each productive coalition contains only individuals
with adjacent productivity.7 Thus, our notion of segregation can be seen as socio-economic
segregation where groups of similarly educated and able individuals form. Homophily re-
quires that if a coalition strictly exceeds the maximum productivity threshold, then all
individuals in the coalition have the same productivity. We include homophily as part of
segregation as it restricts the group size for groups which are not completely homogeneous.
The following example illustrates the concepts introduced in this section.
Example 3.4. Consider an individualistic society pN, λ, τq with N  t1, . . . , 7u and pro-
ductivity levels given by λ1  λ2  λ3 ¡ λ4      λ7. We assume that one needs two
individuals to reach maximum productivity, whereas singletons are not productive at all, so
τp1q  0 and τp2q  1. The partition P  tt1, 3u, t2u, t4, 5, 6, 7uu is an example of a segre-
gated partition. Coalitional assortativity and homophily are easily verified to be satisfied as
each coalition consists of equally productive members.
Let us now check if some partition strictly dominates P  tt1, 3u, t2u, t4, 5, 6, 7uu. All
individuals in t4, 5, 6, 7u obtain their highest possible material payoff of λ4 and their highest
possible relative payoff of 0. Thus, none of these individuals can be strictly better off in
a different coalition. Individuals in the coalition t1, 3u can also not be part of a profitable
deviation, as they obtain the highest possible material payoff of λ1 and cannot increase their
relative payoff as no individual i ¥ 4 can be involved in a profitable deviation. It follows
that individual 2 cannot find another individual to form a deviating coalition. Thus, the
partition P  tt1, 3u, t2u, t4, 5, 6, 7uu is in the Core.
7The coalition S in the definition of coalitional assortativity is restricted to be productive. The coalitions
that belong to some segregated partition may therefore not form a convex geometry as defined in Bilbao,
Jime´nez, and Lo´pez (1998). Moreover, even productive coalitions need not be consecutive/connected as
defined in Greenberg and Weber (1986) and Ambec and Ehlers (2008), since productive coalitions in a
segregated partition do not necessarily consist of consecutively numbered individuals. Example 3.4 presents
a segregated partition with a coalition that is not consecutive.
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4 Results for Egalitarian and Individualistic Societies
In this section, we study the general properties of egalitarian and individualistic societies
with relative payoff preferences. The following procedure turns out to be crucial in finding
Core elements.
Definition 4.1 (Choice of the Strongest (Weakest) Procedure). Choose a strong (weak)
individual and one of the individual’s most preferred coalitions. Add that coalition as an
element of the partition. Repeat the same process with a strong (weak) individual out
of those not assigned to a coalition in a previous step and choose one of the individual’s
most preferred coalitions among those consisting of all individuals which have not yet been
assigned to a coalition. Repeat the process until all individuals are assigned to a coalition
within the partition.
Let us provide some intuition as to why the Choice of the Strongest Procedure helps us
in finding Core partitions in egalitarian societies. In egalitarian societies, in each coalition,
all individuals get the same share of the surplus. Thus, members of a coalition with the
highest possible average surplus cannot be better off in any alternative coalition. Iterating
the argument, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2. Consider an egalitarian society. A partition is in the Core if and only if
it is an outcome of the Choice of the Strongest Procedure.
Proposition 4.2 is closely related to the main result in Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) who
analyze properties of the Core of an egalitarian society under slightly stronger assumptions.
For individualistic societies and a given coalition size, each member prefers the other
members to be as unproductive as possible: the own material payoff does not change, but
the relative payoff increases when other coalition members are less productive. Intuitively,
this gives the weak individuals the power to choose their preferred coalition.
Proposition 4.3. Consider an individualistic society. A partition is in the Core if and only
if it is an outcome of the Choice of the Weakest Procedure.
We define Algorithms A.5 and A.7 in the Appendix. These algorithms generate all Core
partitions in individualistic and egalitarian societies, respectively. In either case, the common
characteristic is that individuals with similar productivity levels group together, where the
most attractive group members are the strongest individuals for egalitarian societies and the
weakest individuals for individualistic societies. We thus obtain our main segregation result.
Theorem 4.4. Let Γ  pN,P, E, t©iuiPNq be a social environment induced by an egalitarian
or an individualistic society pN, λ, τq. The Core is non-empty. Each partition in the Core of
Γ is a segregated partition.
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Intuitively, in an egalitarian (individualistic) society, following the Choice of the Strongest
(Weakest) Procedure, a strong (weak) remaining individual chooses to group together with
other remaining strong (weak) individuals whenever there are sufficiently many other indi-
viduals left to form a productive coalition. Thus, segregation and the Choice of the Strongest
(Weakest) immediately yield an important corollary: if individuals are not part of a produc-
tive coalition, these have to be the least (most) productive ones.
Corollary 4.5.
(i) Consider a partition P in the Core of an egalitarian society. For every i P N such that
|SipPq|   ρ it holds that λi ¤ λnρ 1.
(ii) Consider a partition P in the Core of an individualistic society. For every i P N such
that |SipPq|   ρ it holds that λi ¥ λρ.
In the remainder, we discuss special cases in which the effects leading to the previous
corollary can be seen in the cleanest way. In particular, we will obtain a unique prediction
for the Core: segregated coalitions of size equal to the maximum productivity threshold ρ¯
form and in egalitarian (individualistic) societies at most one coalition with the least (most)
productive individuals does not reach the maximum productivity threshold.
To formalize the result, we first introduce some additional notation. For i, j P N with
i ¤ j, following Greenberg and Weber (1986), the coalition ti, . . . , ju is called a consecutive
coalition and is denoted by ri, js. Let ` and z be non-negative integers such that z   ρ¯ and
the number of individuals in the society equals n  `ρ¯   z. The number ` is equal to the
highest possible number of maximally productive coalitions.
For k P t1, . . . , `u, we define T k  rρ¯pk1q 1, ρ¯ks and call it the kth top-down segregated
coalition. The agents in T ` 1  rnz 1, ns are excluded from participating in a maximally
productive coalition. If T ` 1  H then we define the partition T  tT k | k  1, . . . , `u and
if T ` 1  H, then we define the partition T  tT k | k  1, . . . , `u Y T ` 1. We call T the
top-down segregated partition.
For k P t1, . . . , `u, we define Bk  rn  ρ¯k   1, n  ρ¯pk  1qs and call it the kth bottom-
up segregated coalition. The agents in B` 1  r1, zs are excluded from participating in a
maximally productive coalition. If B` 1  H then we define the partition B  tBk | k 
1, . . . , `u and if B` 1  H, then we define the partition B  tBk | k  1, . . . , `u Y B` 1. We
call B the bottom-up segregated partition.
We now present conditions such that individuals in egalitarian (individualistic) societies
form the top-down (bottom-up) segregated partition. One condition is that no two individ-
uals have exactly the same productivity.
Definition 4.6 (Complete Heterogeneity). A society pN, λ, τq is completely heterogeneous
if all individuals differ in their productivity, i.e., for all i, j P N with i  j, we have λi  λj.
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We first present a characterization of the Core for individualistic societies.
Proposition 4.7. Let Γ  pN,P, E, t©iuiPNq be the social environment induced by the com-
pletely heterogeneous and individualistic society pN, λ, τq. Let τ be strictly increasing up to
ρ¯. The Core is equal to tBu.
For egalitarian societies, we need that consecutive coalitions do not increase their average
surplus by excluding the bottom individual in the coalition.
Definition 4.8 (Cohesiveness of Adjacent Groups). A society satisfies cohesiveness of ad-
jacent groups if for every consecutive coalition ri, js such that 2 ¤ j i  1 ¤ ρ¯ it holds that
upri  1, jsq   upri, jsq.
Cohesiveness of adjacent groups requires that complementarities are large enough, i.e.,
consecutive coalitions of size less than or equal to the maximum productivity threshold ρ¯
prefer to stay together rather dropping the weakest individual from the coalition. This
property implies that τ is strictly increasing up to ρ¯.
In individualistic societies, productive groups always try to reach the maximum pro-
ductivity threshold as this increases the material payoff of each member. In contrast, the
cohesiveness condition imposes a much stronger restriction on partition formation in egal-
itarian societies: here, adding another member to reach the productivity threshold might
decrease the material payoff without the cohesiveness condition. If an extra member is added,
then even if τ increases, the average payoff might decrease.
Under these stronger conditions, we obtain a unique prediction for the Core.
Proposition 4.9. Let Γ  pN,P, E, t©iuiPNq be the social environment induced by the com-
pletely heterogenous and egalitarian society pN, λ, τq which satisfies cohesiveness of adjacent
groups. The Core is equal to tT u.
Under these conditions, we also obtain a clean comparison of Core partitions in both
societies in terms of the resulting material efficiency.
Definition 4.10 (Material Efficiency). Let pN, λ, τq be a society. The material efficiency of
a partition P P P is equal to °iPN mipPq.
The maximal material efficiency a society can reach is given by
°
iPN λi, which is for in-
stance attained if the grand coalition forms. We now compare egalitarian and individualistic
societies in terms of the resulting material efficiency.
Theorem 4.11. Let pN, λ, τq be a completely heterogeneous society which satisfies cohesive-
ness of adjacent groups. The unique Core partition T of the social environment induced by
the egalitarian society is at least as materially efficient as the unique Core partition B of
the social environment induced by the individualistic society. They are equally materially
efficient if and only if n is an integer multiple of ρ¯.
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Only the strongest individuals are excluded from a maximally productive coalition in
individualistic societies, while only the weakest individuals are excluded from a maximally
production coalition in egalitarian societies. Thus, the associated loss in material efficiency
is higher when stronger individuals do not reach their maximal productivity.
5 The Myopic Stable Set
The Core is a static solution concept. Once a Core partition is reached, no coalition has
an incentive to deviate. But, starting from an arbitrary partition in the society, it is not
clear that a partition in the Core will always be reached. In this section, we introduce the
Myopic Stable Set. In the present setting with a finite partition space, the Myopic Stable Set
coincides with the Core whenever for any partition outside the Core, there exists a sequence
of myopic improvements which leads to a partition inside the Core. In such cases, it provides
an additional dynamic foundation for the prediction of the Core.
To define the Myopic Stable Set, it is convenient to define, for every P P P, f˜pPq 
fpPq Y tPu, so f˜pPq is obtained from fpPq by adding the partition P . We define the two-
fold composition of f˜ by f˜ 2pPq  tR P P|DQ P f˜pPq : R P f˜pQqu. For k P N, we define
the k-fold iteration f˜kpPq by induction as f˜kpPq  tR P P|DQ P f˜k1pPq : R P f˜pQqu. We
define the set of all partitions that can be reached from P by a finite number of dominations
by f˜NpPq  kPNf˜kpPq.
If k ¤ `, then f˜kpPq ¤ f˜ `pPq. Because the set P is finite, it therefore holds that there is
k1 P N such that, for every k ¥ k1, f˜kpPq  f˜k1pPq, so f˜NpPq  f˜k1pPq.
We are now ready to introduce the Myopic Stable Set, following the definition of De-
muynck, Herings, Saulle, and Seel (2019) for general social environments.8
Definition 5.1 (Myopic Stable Set). Let Γ  pN,P, E, t©iuiPNq be a social environment
induced by a society. The set M  P is a Myopic Stable Set if it satisfies the following three
conditions:
1. Deterrence of external deviations: For every partition P PM , fpPq M .
2. Iterated external stability: For every Q P PzM , we have that f˜NpQq XM  H.
3. Minimality: There is no proper subset M 1 of M that satisfies Conditions 1 and 2.
8Demuynck, Herings, Saulle, and Seel (2019) allow for social environments with an infinite state space.
For the finite case, their closedness requirement is automatically satisfied and f˜8pQq, the closure of f˜NpQq,
can be replaced by f˜NpQq in the definition of iterated external stability. Thus, for the finite case, the
definition of Myopic Stable Set in Demuynck, Herings, Saulle, and Seel (2019) is equivalent to Definition 5.1.
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The first condition requires that no partition in the set is dominated by a partition
outside the set. By the second condition, from any partition outside the set, there is a finite
sequence of dominations which reaches the set. The final condition requires the set to be a
minimal set which satisfies the first two conditions.
By Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.11 in Demuynck, Herings, Saulle, and Seel (2019) a
Myopic Stable Set (MSS) exists and the Core is a subset of the MSS. Moreover, if the
dominance correspondence f˜ is lower hemi-continuous, then the MSS is unique by their
Theorem 3.4. Lower hemi-continuity of f˜ can be used to show that the intersection of two
Myopic Stable Sets is a Myopic Stable Set itself, which establishes the uniqueness property.
Notice that lower hemi-continuity is trivially satisfied for finite partition spaces. Thus, the
MSS of the social environment induced by a society is always unique. The property of
iterated external stability guarantees that the MSS is non-empty.
The MSS is conceptually related to the Minimal Dominant Set as described for trans-
ferable utility (TU) games in Ko´czy and Lauwers (2007), but there are also some notable
differences between these two notions. Contrary to Ko´czy and Lauwers (2007) we require
that when coalition members leave a coalition, the remaining individuals still form a coali-
tion. We also impose a particular sharing rule for each coalition. Moreover, Ko´czy and
Lauwers (2007) consider weak improvements and require all payoff-equivalent states to be
part of the Minimal Dominant Set.
We now characterize the MSS for our societies.
Theorem 5.2. Let Γ  pN,P, E, t©iuiPNq be a social environment induced by an egalitarian
or individualistic society pN, λ, τq. The Core coincides with the Myopic Stable Set.
The equivalence of the Core and the Myopic Stable Set gives an additional dynamic
foundation for the prediction: from any partition, there is a path of myopic improvements
to a segregated Core partition. We now illustrate such a path of myopic improvements for
the society in Example 3.4.
Example 5.3. Consider an individualistic society with primitives as given in Example 3.4,
i.e., pN, λ, τq with N  t1, . . . , 7u, λ1  λ2  λ3 ¡ λ4      λ7, τp1q  0, and τp2q  1. Let
the initial partition be P0  tt1u, t2, 3u, t4, 5, 6u, t7uu. Forming a coalition with individual 7 is
a strict improvement for individual 2, since the relative payoff of individual 2 improves when
individual 3 is replaced by individual 7. Since the material payoff improves for individual 7 by
forming a productive coalition, forming a coalition with individual 2 is a strict improvement
for individual 7 as well. The new partition is given by P1  tt1u, t2, 7u, t3u, t4, 5, 6uu. In the
next step, both individuals 1 and 3 increase their material payoffs by forming a coalition.
The new partition is given by P2  tt1, 3u, t2, 7u, t4, 5, 6uu, a partition in the Core.
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For general social environments, the Myopic Stable Set can be strictly larger than the
Core. For instance, this happens in all situations where the Core is empty, as the Myopic
Stable Set always exists and is non-empty. One such example is provided in the Appendix for
the case where preferences are determined by a convex combination of material and relative
payoffs. The following example demonstrates that the Myopic Stable Set can also be a strict
superset of the Core when the Core is non-empty.
Example 5.4. Consider a society with three agents and assume material payoffs to be
given by mptt1u, t2u, t3uuq  p0, 0, 0q, mptt1, 2u, t3uuq  p3, 1, 0q, mptt1u, t2, 3uuq  p0, 3, 1q,
mptt1, 3u, t2uuq  p1, 0, 3q, and mptt1, 2, 3uuq  p2, 2, 2q. The Core is given by tt1, 2, 3uu.
Any partition where a two-agent coalition forms does not belong to the Core as it can be
blocked by another two-agent coalition. Since it is impossible to reach the Core from such a
partition by a path of myopic improvements, the Myopic Stable Set must be strictly larger
than the Core. It is easily verified that the Myopic Stable Set is given by all partitions
where a two-agent or a three-agent coalition forms. The material payoffs in this example
cannot result in an egalitarian or individualistic society, so the example does not contradict
Theorem 5.2.
6 Robustness
In this section, we relax our assumptions on the preferences and the production function.
6.1 Beyond Lexicographic Preferences
In the main text, we have assumed for analytical convenience that individuals have lex-
icographic preferences. Individuals care first about material payoffs, then about relative
payoffs. We now consider how our results change in individualistic societies if we re-
lax this assumption.9 Suppose preferences can be represented by a convex combination
of the material and relative payoffs, i.e., for every S P N , payoffs of i P S are equal to
pipSq  µm
ind
i pSq   p1  µqr
ind
i pSq for some given µ P p0, 1q. This can be rewritten as
pipSq  µm
ind
i pSq   p1  µqr
ind
i pSq
 µmindi pSq   p1  µqpm
ind
i pSq  upSqq
 mindi pSq  p1  µqupSq.
First note that for any given parameters, there exists an  ¡ 0 such that the results in
the main text extend to µ P p1  , 1q: for µ sufficiently large, when the material payoffs
differ, individual i always prefers the coalition with the higher material payoff. Only in
9In egalitarian societies, relative payoffs are always equal to zero and results remain the same.
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case of equal material payoffs, i prefers the coalition with the higher relative payoffs which
reconstructs the preferences from the main text.
Second, for any given parameters, there also exists an  ¡ 0, such that for µ P p0, q
each individual prefers the coalition with the highest relative payoff. In particular, for a
completely heterogeneous and individualistic society, this leads to only singleton coalitions,
as no individual wants to be the least productive member of a coalition.
For intermediate values of µ, the Core might be empty. In the Appendix we provide an
example with an empty Core and we derive the Myopic Stable Set for that example.
6.2 A Different Production Function
In the main text, the function τ depends on the size of each coalition. Instead, this function
might depend on the sum of the individual productivities, i.e., τpSq  τp
°
iPS λiq with a
surplus upSq  τp
°
iPS λiq
°
iPS λi. In this case, the results are similar, but less clean as the
following example illustrates.
Example 6.1. Consider an individualistic society. Suppose τpSq  1 if
°
iPS λi ¥ 10 and
τpSq  0 otherwise. Let n  8, λ1  5.5, λ2  5.1, λ3  4.5, λ4  4.3, λ5  4.2, λ6  4.1, λ7 
4, λ8  3, λ9  2, and λ10  1.
In this case, segregation starts bottom-up: The coalition t7, 8, 9, 10u yields the strictly
highest material payoff and - conditional on being productive - the highest relative payoff
for each member. Among the remaining individuals, the same is true for coalition t4, 5, 6u.
Among the first three individuals, only coalitions involving individual 1 are productive.
But the formation of coalition t1, 2u or t1, 2, 3u leads to a profitable deviation by coali-
tion t1, 3u. In both cases, the relative payoff improves for individual 1 since an individ-
ual with above-average productive is dropped while the coalition remains productive. The
material payoff of individual 3 increases in the former case, whereas it remains constant
while the relative payoff increases in the latter case. Thus, the unique Core element is
tt1, 3u, t2u, t4, 5, 6u, t7, 8, 9, 10uu. This partition is not segregated as λ1 ¡ λ2 ¡ λ3 and yet
the productive coalition t1, 3u is not a consecutive coalition.
Thus, as in the main text, a weak individual chooses a preferred coalition in each step.
Yet, in contrast to the main text, a productive coalition is not necessarily segregated, as indi-
viduals who have above-average productivity and are not pivotal for a productivity increase
might be dropped.
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Appendix
A.1 Preliminaries
We establish a simple but useful result for the case in which some individuals have the
same productivity level. Informally, if a partition in which these individuals are in different
coalitions is in the Core, then all partitions in which these individuals swap their coalitions
are also in the Core. To define this formally, for given P ,Q P P, let h : N Ñ N be
a productivity preserving permutation, i.e., h is a one-to-one mapping such that hpiq  j
implies λi  λj. Moreover, we define hpSq  tj P N | Di P S such that j  hpiqu as the
image of S under h.
Definition A.1 (Equivalence). Let pN, λ, τq be a society. The partitions P and Q in P
are equivalent if there is a productivity preserving permutation h such that for all coalitions
S P P it holds that hpSq P Q.
Since h can be the identity, any partition P is equivalent to itself. We denote the
equivalence class of a partition P by rPs. The next result shows if a partition is in the Core,
then all equivalent partitions are also in the Core.
Proposition A.2. Let Γ  pN,P, E, t©iuiPNq be a social environment induced by an egali-
tarian or an individualistic society. If P P C, then rPs  C.
Proof. Assume P P C and Q P rPs. Let h be a productivity preserving permutation such
that for all coalitions S P P it holds that hpSq P Q. Suppose Q R C. Then there exists R P P
and T P N such that R P fT pQq. We define h1pRq  tS P N | hpSq P Ru. It holds that
h1pRq P fh1pT qpPq, contradicting that P P C.
We will show when proving Theorem 5.2 that the predictions of the Myopic Stable Set
and the Core coincide. Thus, if the Myopic Stable Set contains a partition P , it also contains
all partitions in rPs.
The following lemmas are helpful in the proof of Theorem 4.4. In a coalition where some
individuals differ in productivity and where the size exceeds the maximum productivity
threshold, the members are better off excluding the least (most) productive individual in an
egalitarian (individualistic) society.
Lemma A.3. Let Γ  pN,P, E, t©iuiPNq be a social environment induced by an egalitarian
society pN, λ, τq. Let P P P and S P P be such that |S| ¡ ρ¯ and λi  λj for some i, j P S.
Then fSztbpSqupPq  H.
Proof. Consider the coalition T  SztbpSqu. Since |T | ¥ ρ¯, we have upSq  upT q   λbpSq.
Observe that λbpSq   upSq since λi  λj for some i, j P S. Hence, we have upT q ¡ upSq.
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Lemma A.4. Let Γ  pN,P, E, t©iuiPNq be a social environment induced by an individu-
alistic society pN, λ, τq. Let P P P and S P P be such that |S| ¡ ρ¯ and λi  λj for some
i, j P S. Then fSzttpSqupPq  H.
Proof. Consider the coalition T  SzttpSqu. Since |T | ¥ ρ¯, we have mindi pT q  m
ind
i pSq for
all i P T . Hence, to prove that fSzttpSqu  H, it remains to show that r
ind
i pT q ¡ r
ind
i pSq for
all i P T .
Observe that λtpSq ¡ upSq since λi  λj for some i, j P S. Hence, we have upT q   upSq
and thus, for every i P T, rindi pT q  m
ind
i pT q  upT q ¡ m
ind
i pSq  upSq  r
ind
i pSq.
A.2 Proofs of the Results from the Main Text
Proof of Proposition 4.2. We first show that if a partition is an outcome of the Choice of the
Strongest (henceforth CotS) Procedure, it is in the Core for an egalitarian society.
Any member of the coalition chosen by CotS in the first round obtains the highest possible
material payoff. Thus, no such member can be involved in a myopic improvement. Iterate
the argument for each of the following rounds of the CotS procedure to obtain the result.
We now show that any Core element for an egalitarian society can be obtained by the
CotS procedure.
Take a partition in the Core. Note that the partition must contain at least one coalition
with the highest possible material payoff per member as such a coalition would have a
profitable deviation otherwise. As utility is increasing in the productivity of the group
members, a strongest individual must be part of this group. Thus, this coalition can be
picked up in the first round of the CotS procedure. Iterate the argument as long as the
number of remaining individuals is greater than or equal to ρ. As soon as the number of
remaining individuals is less than ρ, then all remaining coalitions generate a surplus equal
to zero. Any strongest individual among the remaining individuals and his coalition can be
picked up by the CotS procedure. Iterate the argument to obtain the result.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. We first show that if a partition is an outcome of the Choice of the
Weakest (henceforth CotW) Procedure, it is also in the Core for an individualistic society.
To do so, we first establish that each member of the coalition chosen by the weakest
individual in the first round of the CotW procedure prefers that coalition over any other
coalition. Since preferences are lexicographic, the weakest individual chooses a coalition
which obtains the maximal possible value of τ among all possible coalitions. Moreover, this
coalition obtains the lowest possible value of u among all coalitions with the maximal value
of τ . Therefore, all individuals in a preferred coalition of the weak individual weakly prefer
that coalition over any other coalition. Thus, no such individual can be part of a deviating
coalition. Iterating the argument with the remaining individuals leads to the result.
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We now show that any Core element can be obtained by the CotW procedure.
Consider a partition in the Core. Towards a contradiction, suppose that no weakest
individual is in one of the individual’s most preferred coalitions. Consider a deviation by a
coalition S that is the most preferred coalition of a weakest individual. Such a coalition has
the highest possible value of τ and, conditional on having the highest possible value of τ, the
lowest possible value of u. This makes all weakest individuals in the coalition strictly better
off. Moreover, all other members of that coalition receive a weakly higher material payoff
as the weakest individual chooses a coalition with the maximal possible value of τ. They
are strictly better off if their material payoff is higher. Consider a non-weakest individual
i P S with the same material payoff as in the individual’s original coalition, say T. If T
contains some weakest individual, then upSq   upT q by the assumption that no weakest
individual is in one of the individual’s most preferred coalitions. If T contains no weakest
individuals, then upSq   upT q, since the replacement of one member in T by a weakest
individual leads to a lower value of u, whereas S has the lowest such value conditional on
having the highest possible value of τ. In both cases, we have rindi pSq   r
ind
i pT q. We conclude
that all members of S are strictly better off. Thus, the partition cannot be in the Core.
Consequently, in every Core element at least one weakest individual has to be in one of the
individual’s most preferred coalitions. Thus, this coalition can be picked up in the first step
of the CotW procedure. Iterate the argument as long as the number of remaining individuals
is greater than or equal to ρ. When the number of remaining individuals is less than ρ, then
all remaining coalitions generate a surplus equal to zero. Any weakest individual among the
remaining individuals and his coalition can be picked up by the CotW procedure. Iterate
the argument to obtain the result.
An Algorithm to Find All Partitions in the Core
In what follows, we provide an algorithm to find all Core partitions of a given society.
From the previous results, we know that a partition is in the Core of an individualistic
society if and only if it can be picked up by the Choice of the Weakest Procedure. We now
characterize all such partitions. We call ri k, is for k P t0, . . . , i 1u a downward adjacent
coalition of i and ri, n ks for k P t0, . . . , n iu an upward adjacent coalition of i.
Our algorithm results in a weighted directed rooted tree pV,A, v0q, where V is a set of
decision nodes, A  V  V is a set of ordered pairs of nodes called arcs, and v0 is a given
initial decision node. At each decision node, it has to be decided how big a coalition to form.
Each possible coalition size results in an arc from the current decision node to a successor
decision node. To each arc a P A, we associate an integer µa P N called its weight. This
weight µa is equal to the size of the coalition that is formed at the current decision node.
Given some v P V, we denote by Av  A the set of all arcs on the directed path from v0 to v.
Since pV,A, v0q is a directed rooted tree, the set Av is uniquely determined, see Theorem 9A
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of Wilson (1985). To each decision node v, we associate a number npvq, the number of
individuals that are not yet assigned to a coalition.
Algorithm A.5. Let pN, λ, τq be an individualistic society. Let v  v0 with v0 the initial
decision node. The initial set of arcs A is equal to the empty set.
Step 1 Define npvq  n 
°
aPAv µa. If npvq ¡ 0, consider all downward adjacent coalitions
of npvq. Denote the number of downward adjacent coalitions which are most preferred
by npvq by k. Add k arcs starting at v and ending at distinct new nodes. The arcs all
have different weights, each equal to the size of a most preferred downward adjacent
coalition of npvq. If npvq  0, then v is a terminal node and no new decision node is
created.
Step 2 For each new decision node v created in Step 1, go back to Step 1. Step 2 finishes
when there are no new decision nodes anymore.
Step 3 Consider the weighted rooted directed tree pV,A, v0q resulting from Steps 1 and 2.
For every terminal node v, let pa1, . . . , a`q be the arcs on the path from v
0 to v, and
generate the partition
!
r1, n
°`1
k1µaks, . . . , rn µa1   1, ns
)
.
Step 4 Collect all the partitions created in Step 3 and add all equivalent partitions.
We use Example 3.4 to illustrate Algorithm A.5. The weighted directed rooted tree
generated in Steps 1 and 2 is illustrated in Figure 1. This directed rooted tree has five
terminal nodes, resulting in five partitions in Step 3:
P1  tt1, 2, 3u, t4, 5u, t6, 7uu,
P2  tt1u, t2, 3u, t4, 5u, t6, 7uu,
P3  tt1, 2u, t3, 4u, t5, 6, 7uu,
P4  tt1u, t2, 3u, t4, 5, 6, 7uu,
P5  tt1, 2, 3u, t4, 5, 6, 7uu.
Step 4 adds equivalent partitions. By elementary combinatorics, this leads to two addi-
tional partitions for P1, eight additional partitions for P2, eleven additional partitions for
P3, two additional partitions for P4, and no additional partitions for P5. None of these par-
titions is identical. Thus, we have a total of 28 segregated partitions which we list ordered
by equivalence classes in the following table.
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5
2
3
3
0
2
1
3
4
2
2
2
0
4
3
2
1
1
0
3
0
1
0
P1
P2
P3 P4
P5
Figure 1: Result of Steps 1 and 2 of Algorithm A.5 for Example 3.4. The number npvq
is displayed in the circles, the numbers µa are displayed on the arcs, and the generated
partitions are indicated at the bottom.
rP1s tt1, 2, 3u, t4, 5u, t6, 7uu; tt1, 2, 3u, t4, 6u, t5, 7uu; tt1, 2, 3u, t4, 7u, t5, 6uu
rP2s tt1u, t2, 3u, t4, 5u, t6, 7uu; tt1u, t2, 3u, t4, 6u, t5, 7uu; tt1u, t2, 3u, t4, 7u, t5, 6uu;
tt2u, t1, 3u, t4, 5u, t6, 7uu; tt2u, t1, 3u, t4, 6u, t5, 7uu; tt2u, t1, 3u, t4, 7u, t5, 6uu;
tt3u, t1, 2u, t4, 5u, t6, 7uu; tt3u, t1, 2u, t4, 6u, t5, 7uu; tt3u, t1, 2u, t4, 7u, t5, 6uu
rP3s tt1, 2u, t3, 4u, t5, 6, 7uu; tt1, 2u, t3, 5u, t4, 6, 7uu; tt1, 2u, t3, 6u, t4, 5, 7uu;
tt1, 2u, t3, 7u, t4, 5, 6uu; tt1, 3u, t2, 4u, t5, 6, 7uu; tt1, 3u, t2, 5u, t4, 6, 7uu;
tt1, 3u, t2, 6u, t4, 5, 7uu; tt1, 3u, t2, 7u, t4, 5, 6uu; tt2, 3u, t1, 4u, t5, 6, 7uu;
tt2, 3u, t1, 5u, t4, 6, 7uu; tt2, 3u, t1, 6u, t4, 5, 7uu; tt2, 3u, t1, 7u, t4, 5, 6uu
rP4s tt1u, t2, 3u, t4, 5, 6, 7uu; tt2u, t1, 3u, t4, 5, 6, 7uu; tt3u, t1, 2u, t4, 5, 6, 7uu
rP5s tt1, 2, 3u, t4, 5, 6, 7uu
Proposition A.6. Let pN, λ, τq be an individualistic society. A partition is in the Core if
and only if it is generated by Algorithm A.5.
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Proof. We first show that any partition generated by Algorithm A.5 is in the Core for an
individualistic society.
In Step 1 of the algorithm, the bottom individual among the remaining individuals
chooses one of the individual’s most preferred coalitions. Thus, any partition generated
by the algorithm in Step 3 can be obtained by the CotW procedure and is thus in the Core
for an individualistic society by Proposition 4.3. The equivalent partitions generated by the
algorithm in Step 4 are in the Core for an individualistic society by Proposition A.2.
For the reverse direction, recall that any partition in the Core can be constructed by
CotW. Steps 1-3 of the algorithm generate all CotW partitions where the bottom individual
among the remaining individuals chooses. Step 4 then includes also all equivalent parti-
tions where any weak individual among the remaining individuals chooses and thereby all
partitions that can be reached by CotW, i.e., all Core partitions by Proposition 4.3.
The algorithm to find the Core elements in egalitarian societies proceeds along the same
lines, but now the top individual among the remaining individuals chooses first.
Algorithm A.7. Let pN, λ, τq be an egalitarian society. Let v  v0 with v0 the initial
decision node. The initial set of arcs A is equal to the empty set.
Step 1 Define npvq  n 
°
aPAv µa. If npvq ¡ 0, consider all upward adjacent coalitions
of n  npvq   1. Denote the number of upward adjacent coalitions which are most
preferred by n  npvq   1 by k. Add k arcs starting at v and ending at distinct new
nodes. The arcs all have different weights, each equal to the size of a most preferred
upward adjacent coalition of n  npvq   1. If npvq  0, then v is a terminal node and
no new decision node is created.
Step 2 For each new decision node created in Step 1, go back to Step 1. Step 2 finishes
when there are no new decision nodes anymore.
Step 3 Consider the weighted rooted directed tree pV,A, v0q resulting from Steps 1 and 2.
For every terminal node v, let pa1, . . . , a`q be the arcs on the path from v
0 to v, and
generate the partition!
r1, µa1s, . . . , r
°`1
k1µak   1, ns
)
.
Step 4 Collect all the partitions created in Step 3 and add all equivalent partitions.
Proposition A.8. Let pN, λ, τq be an egalitarian society. A partition is in the Core if and
only it is generated by Algorithm A.7 .
As Algorithm A.7 is the mirror image of Algorithm A.5, we omit the proof of Proposi-
tion A.8.
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Proof of Theorem 4.4.
The proof consists of three parts. First, we prove non-emptiness of the Core. Second, we
prove homophily and finally coalitional assortativity of each Core element.
1. By Propositions A.6 and A.8, all Core elements are obtained by Algorithms A.5 and
A.7. Note that in each step of the algorithm a top/bottom individual exists and is matched
to a coalition in the partition. Thus, after at most n steps we reach a partition in the Core,
i.e., the Core is non-empty.
2. Towards a contradiction, suppose there is a Core partition with a coalition such that
|S| ¡ ρ¯ and there is i, j P S such that λi  λj. Then, by Lemmas A.3 and A.4 there exists a
profitable deviation, a contradiction which establishes homophily.
3. Reconsider the Choice of the Weakest/Strongest procedure. In an egalitarian society, a
strongest individual among the remaining individuals chooses a coalition S which maximizes
upSq.Whenever the remaining number of individuals is greater than or equal to ρ, maximality
can only be achieved if |S|  1 others with the highest productivities are chosen. Coalitional
assortativity follows. For individualistic societies, a weakest individual among the remaining
individuals chooses a coalition S which maximizes τp|S|q and among all such coalitions the
one that minimizes upSq since a higher average payoff decreases the own relative payoff.
Whenever the remaining number of individuals is greater than or equal to ρ, minimality can
only be achieved if the other coalition members have the lowest productivity. Coalitional
assortativity follows.
Proof of Proposition 4.7. Consider the Choice of the Weakest procedure. Recall that τ
is strictly increasing up to ρ¯. Thus, if possible, the weakest remaining individual chooses
a coalition with the other ρ¯  1 remaining individuals with the lowest productivities; this
coalition is unique by complete heterogeneity. Otherwise, as τ is strictly increasing, the
weakest remaining individual chooses a coalition with all remaining individuals. We thus
obtain the partition r1, zs, rz   1, z   ρ¯s, . . . , rn  ρ¯   1, ns, where ` and z are non-negative
integers such that z   ρ¯ and the number of individuals in the society equals n  `ρ¯  z.
Proof of Proposition 4.9. Consider the Choice of the Strongest Procedure. Assume that
there are at least ρ¯ remaining individuals. We argue that the strongest remaining individual
chooses a coalition with the other ρ¯1 remaining individuals with the highest productivities;
this coalition is unique by complete heterogeneity. It follows from complete heterogeneity
that the material payoff for the strongest remaining individual is higher than in any other
coalition with ρ¯ members chosen from the remaining individuals. Moreover, since τpρ¯q  1,
this payoff is also higher than in any coalition of size larger than ρ¯ chosen from the remaining
individuals. The most productive coalitions of smaller size can be obtained by consecutively
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dropping the bottom individual. It follows from cohesiveness of adjacent groups, that the
material payoff of the strongest remaining individual is then lower. If there are less than
ρ¯ remaining individuals, then the strongest remaining individual chooses a coalition with
all remaining individuals. The most productive coalitions of smaller size can be obtained
by consecutively dropping the bottom individual. It follows from cohesiveness of adjacent
groups, that the material payoff of the strongest remaining individual is then lower. We
thus obtain the partition r1, ρ¯s, rρ¯   1, . . . , 2ρ¯s, . . . , r`ρ¯   1, . . . , `ρ¯   zs, where ` and z are
non-negative integers such that z   ρ¯ and the number of individuals in the society equals
n  `ρ¯  z.
Proof of Theorem 4.11. Let ` and z be non-negative integers such that z   ρ¯ and the
number of individuals in the society equals n  `ρ¯   z. By the proof of Proposition 4.9, in
the egalitarian case, the total material payoff equals
°
iPN λi  p1  τpzqq
°n
inz 1 λi. For
the individualistic society, by the proof of Proposition 4.7, total material payoffs are equal
to
°
iPN λi  p1  τpzqq
°z
i1 λi.
If z  0, i.e., n is an integer multiple of ρ¯, both societies reach the maximal material
efficiency equal to
°
iPN λi. If z ¡ 0, then z individuals are part of a coalition of size z,
which is not maximally productive. Thus 1 ¡ τpzq ¡ 0 and by complete heterogeneity,
we have
°z
i1 λi ¡
°n
inz 1 λi. We conclude that total material payoffs are lower in the
individualistic society than in the egalitarian society.
Proof of Theorem 5.2: Notice that the Core trivially satisfies deterrence of external de-
viations. In order to show that it coincides with the Myopic Stable Set, we have to show
that it satisfies iterated external stability. The minimality requirement follows from the fact
that the Core is a subset of the Myopic Stable Set.
Egalitarian Societies
The proof of iterated external stability is constructive using the following procedure,
which, given an initial partition P0 P PzC, generates a finite sequence of productive coalitions
S1, . . . , S` and partitions P1, . . . ,P` such that, for k  1, . . . , `, Pk P f˜SkpPk1q and P` is a
partition in the Core. The coalitions Sk are all disjoint and chosen such that their members
have the highest productivity among agents in Nzp
k1
κ1 S
κq.
Start with a partition P0 P PzC. We define k  1.
(i) If |Nz
k1
κ1 S
κ|   ρ, then the procedure ends. Otherwise, move to (ii).
(ii) Consider a coalition T  Nz
k1
κ1 S
κ with upT q P argmaxtupSq : SX
k1
κ1 S
κ  Hu.
By monotonicity of u in λ, for all i P T and for all j P Nzp
k1
κ1 S
κ Y T q it holds that
λi ¥ λj. If fT pPk1q  H, then define Sk  T. If fT pPk1q  H, then some member of
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T belongs to a productive coalition S P Pk1 such that upSq  upT q. For all i P S, for all
j P Nzp
k1
κ1 S
κYSq, it holds that λi ¥ λj. In this case, define S
k  S. In both cases, define
Pk  QpPk1, Skq. Increase k by 1 and move back to (i).
The iteration takes ` ¤ n steps and finally generates the partition P`. The collection of
productive coalitions in P` is given by tSk | k P t1, . . . , `uu. It holds that P` P f˜ `pP0q since,
for every k P t1, . . . , `u, Pk P fSkpPk1q or Pk  Pk1.
It remains to be shown that P` belongs to the Core. Note that in each step of the
procedure, at least one strongest individual among the remaining individuals is added to
one of the individual’s most preferred coalitions among the remaining individuals. At the
point where less than ρ agents are left, a strongest individual i among the remaining agents
cannot do better than choosing coalition SipP`q. Thus, we can retrieve the procedure with
the Choice of Strongest procedure and the partition P` is in the Core.
Individualistic Societies
The proof of iterated external stability is constructive using the following procedure,
which, given an initial partition P0 P PzC, generates a finite sequence of productive coalitions
S1, . . . , S` and partitions P1, . . . ,P` such that, for k  1, . . . , `, Pk P f˜SkpPk1q and P` is a
partition in the Core. The coalitions Sk are all disjoint and chosen such that their members
have the lowest productivity among agents in Nzp
k1
κ1 S
κq.
Start with a partition P0 P PzC. Parts (i) and (ii) formalize a sequence of dominations
where first a productive coalition with weak individuals forms and so forth until a strongest
productive coalition forms. We define k  1.
(i) If |Nz
k1
κ1 S
κ|   ρ, then the procedure ends. Otherwise, move to (ii).
(ii) Consider a coalition T  Nz
k1
κ1 S
κ with |T |  mintρ¯, |Nz
k1
κ1 S
κ|u such that for
all i P T and for all j P Nzp
k1
κ1 S
κYT q it holds that λi ¤ λj. If fT pPk1q  H, then define
Sk  T. If fT pPk1q  H, then there is i1 P T who belongs to a coalition S P Pk1 such that
mindi1 pSq  m
ind
i1 pT q and r
ind
i1 pSq ¥ r
ind
i1 pT q. Since
mindi1 pSq  u¯pSq  r
ind
i1 pSq ¥ r
ind
i1 pT q  m
ind
i1 pT q  u¯pT q  m
ind
i1 pSq  u¯pT q,
we have that u¯pSq ¤ u¯pT q. The construction of T now implies u¯pSq  u¯pT q. It follows that,
for all i P S, for all j P Nzp
k1
κ1 S
κ Y Sq, λi ¤ λj. In this case, define S
k  S. Define
Pk  QpPk1, Skq. Increase k by 1 and move back to (i).
The procedure takes ` ¤ n{ρ¯ 1 steps and finally generates the partition P`. The collection
of productive coalitions in P` is given by tSk | k P t1, . . . , `uu. It holds that P` P f˜ `pP0q since,
for every k P t1, . . . , `u, Pk P fSkpPk1q or Pk  Pk1.
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It remains to be shown that P` belongs to the Core. Note that in each step of the
procedure, at least one weakest individual among the remaining agents is added to one of
the individual’s most preferred coalitions among those remaining individuals. At the point
where less than ρ agents are left, a weakest individual i among the remaining agents cannot
do better than choosing coalition SipP`q. Thus, we can retrieve the process with the Choice
of Weakest procedure and the partition P` is in the Core.
A.3 An Example of an Empty Core and a Non-Empty Myopic
Stable Set
Consider an individualistic society in the setting of Subsection 6.1, where preferences are
determined by a convex combination of material and relative payoffs. Let n  4, λ1 
1, λ2  0.99, λ3  0.98, λ4  0.25, τp1q  0, τp2q  0.8, τp3q  τp4q  1, and µ  0.75.
Core We show that the Core is empty.
Note first that any individual prefers any non-singleton coalition to staying alone as, for
any S P N with |S| ¥ 2, for any j P S, it holds that
pjpSq  τp|S|q

λj  p1  0.75q 
°
iPS λi
|S|


¡ 0,
since τp|S|q ¡ 0, λj ¥ 0.25, and
°
iPS λi{|S|   1. Thus, a partition in the Core cannot
contain more than one singleton coalition.
Case 1: A partition with two coalitions of size 2.
We will show that any member of the coalition t1, 2, 3u is better off compared to staying
in a coalition of size 2.
Consider a partition with two coalitions of size 2. For any i P t1, 2, 3u, we can bound the
payoff of an individual i in a coalition S of size 2 from above by the highest possible payoff
of individual 1 in a coalition of size 2:
pipSq ¤ 0.8

1  p1  0.75q 
1   0.25
2


 0.675.
In the coalition t1, 2, 3u, the payoff of i P t1, 2, 3u is bounded from below by
pipt1, 2, 3uq ¥ p3pt1, 2, 3uq  0.98  p1  0.75q 
1   0.99   0.98
3
 0.7325 ¡ 0.675.
Thus, a partition with two coalitions of size 2 cannot be part of the Core.
Case 2: A partition with one coalition of size 3 and one coalition of size 1.
(a) Suppose the coalition of size 3 is t1, 2, 3u. Then coalition t1, 2, 4u can profitably
deviate: individual 4 increases its payoff to above zero, while individuals 1 and 2 benefit
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from an increase in relative payoffs by forming a coalition with individual 4 rather than
individual 3.
(b) Suppose the coalition S of size 3 contains individual 4. Let i be the individual in
the singleton coalition. Then the coalition ti, 4u can profitably deviate. Individual i gets a
positive payoff and thus improves upon staying single. In the coalition of size 3, individual
4 has a payoff of
p4pSq ¤ p4pt2, 3, 4uq  0.25  p1  0.75q 
0.99   0.98   0.25
3
 0.065.
In the coalition ti, 4u, the payoff of individual 4 satisfies
p4pti, 4uq ¥ p4pt1, 4uq  0.8

0.25  p1  0.75q 
1   0.25
2


 0.075 ¡ 0.065.
Case 3: The grand coalition forms.
In this case, the coalition t2, 3, 4u is better off by deviating, as the material payoffs remain
the same, but the relative payoffs improve by the exclusion of individual 1.
Thus, there are no partitions which do not allow for profitable deviations, i.e., the Core
is empty.
Myopic Stable Set Let P4 be the set of partitions with one coalition of size 4, i.e. P4 
ttt1, 2, 3, 4uuu, P3 be the set of partitions with one coalition of size 3, so P3 has 4 elements,
and P2 be the set of partitions with two coalitions of size 2, so P2 has 3 elements. We define
the set of partitions M as
M  P4 Y P3 Y P2 Y ttt2, 4u, t1u, t3uuu Y ttt3, 4u, t1u, t2uuu
and demonstrate that the Myopic Stable Set is equal to M.
Deterrence of External Deviations: We first argue thatM satisfies deterrence of external
deviations.
Since the payoff of an individual in a singleton coalition is equal to 0, there are no
profitable deviations by a single agent. Therefore, there is no deviation from a partition in
M to the partition tt1u, t2u, t3u, t4uu.
We now argue that there are no profitable deviations from partitions in M to the parti-
tions tt1, 2u, t3u, t4uu, tt1, 3u, t2u, t4uu, tt1, 4u, t2u, t3uu, and tt2, 3u, t1u, t4uu. Such a parti-
tion can only be reached from partitions in P2 when the resulting coalition of size 2 deviates
or from partitions in P3 when the resulting coalition of size 2 deviates and is part of the
coalition of size 3 before the deviation.
There are no such profitable deviations from partitions in P2. A coalition partner of
individual 4 in a partition in P2 cannot profitably deviate with another individual since
material payoffs remain the same and relative payoffs would decrease. The only remaining
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possibility from a partition in P2 is a deviation by coalition t1, 4u. But then the relative
payoff of individual 4 would decrease, whereas the material payoff remains the same.
There are also no such profitable deviations from partitions in P3. The partition
tt1, 2u, t3u, t4uu can only be reached from the partitions tt1, 2, 3u, t4uu and tt1, 2, 4u, t3uu
by a deviation by coalition t1, 2u. This would lead to a decrease in material and relative
payoffs for individuals 1 and 2, so it is not profitable. The partition tt1, 3u, t2u, t4uu can
only be reached from the partitions tt1, 2, 3u, t4uu and tt1, 3, 4u, t2uu by a deviation by
coalition t1, 3u. This would lead to a decrease in material and relative payoffs for individ-
ual 1, so it is not profitable. The partition tt1, 4u, t2u, t3uu can only be reached from the
partitions tt1, 2, 4u, t3uu and tt1, 3, 4u, t2uu by a deviation by coalition t1, 4u. It holds that
p1pt1, 3, 4uq ¡ p1pt1, 2, 4uq  0.813 ¡ 0.675  p1pt1, 4uq, so such a deviation is not prof-
itable for individual 1. Finally, the partition tt2, 3u, t1u, t4uu can only be reached from the
partitions tt1, 2, 3u, t4uu and tt2, 3, 4u, t1uu by a deviation by coalition t2, 3u. Payoffs for
individuals 2 and 3 are higher in coalition t2, 3, 4u than in coalition t1, 2, 3u, which were
shown to be higher than their payoffs in any coalition of size 2. Such a deviation is therefore
not profitable for individuals 2 and 3.
Iterated External Stability: The set M satisfies iterated external stability, since we
argued before that any member of the coalition t1, 2, 3u is better off compared to staying in
a coalition of size 1 or 2.
Minimality: We show that M satisfies minimality by arguing that, for every P P M,
f˜NpPq  M, i.e. the set M is a so-called closed cycle and therefore each element in it has
to be part of the Myopic Stable Set by Theorem 3.9 in Demuynck, Herings, Saulle, and Seel
(2019).
Consider any partition in M with no coalition of size 3 or larger. We argued before
that the coalition t1, 2, 3u has a profitable deviation. It holds that P3  f˜ptt1, 2, 3u, t4uuq
since material payoffs would remain the same and relative payoffs would improve after a
deviation by a three-agent coalition different from t1, 2, 3u. The same argument plus the
observation that individual 4 obtains a positive payoff shows that P4  fptt1, 2, 3u, t4uuq. It
clearly holds that tt2, 3, 4u, t1uu P fptt1, 2, 3, 4uuq. From any partition with a coalition of size
3 different from t1, 2, 3u, individual 4 has a profitable deviation by forming a coalition with
the unmatched individual, which reaches all partitions with two coalitions of size 2. It holds
that tt2, 4u, t1u, t3uu P fptt1, 4u, t2, 3uuq and tt3, 4u, t1u, t2uu P fptt2, 4u, t1, 3uuq. It follows
that, for every P P M, M  f˜NpPq. Since M satisfies deterrence of external deviations, we
obtain that, for every P PM, f˜NpPq M.
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